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Introduction  
This commentary reviews contemporary changes in aid modalities and their 
impact on processes of decentralization.  The main change in aid delivery 
and disbursement considered is towards a greater emphasis on general 
budget support (GBS) and sector wide approaches (SWAPs).  This includes 
considering the broad questions of firstly, the impact of emphasising GBS 
on local government and governance systems, and secondly, the extent to 
which processes of decentralization can fit in with this new approach. 
 
The paper is not the result of a formal research project, but reflects the 
findings of a wide range of consultancy activities; in particular, work for 
OECD in 2002 on aid effectiveness in Uganda; work for the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID) on aid instruments in 
India and Asia; evaluation of budget support in Uganda and Malawi; and 
work for UNDP in Rwanda on donor coordination and harmonisation.  
 
The paper is structured as follows.  The first section provides the general 
background and a discussion of new aid modalities.  The following sections 
are concerned with the relationship between new aid modalities and 
decentralisation in general; a review of the experience of Uganda; and 
finally a discussion of the question of whether these new aid modalities are 
strengthening or weakening processes of decentralization and local 
government and governance. 
New Aid Modalities 
Since the late 1990s there has been a move amongst many donors to 
provide budget support as a mechanism to improve the effectiveness of aid. 
General budget support involves the transfer of un-earmarked donor funds 
directly to the recipient government’s budget.  This is often discussed in 
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contradistinction to traditional project funding and to sector wide 
approaches.  
 
The broad philosophy behind the move to GBS is an attempt to make the 
donor-recipient relationship a more mature one than under previous 
approaches – especially project funding.  Thus where both sides agree on 
broad objectives – a poverty focus within a market framework – the donor 
need not worry about the detail and can provide the recipient government 
with a stable source of funding and some flexibility in expenditure.1  This 
approach is based upon ideas of partnership rather than a relationship based 
on patronage and/or charity.  A key aspect is to work with and use existing 
government systems.  This approach also requires complementary inputs: 
dialogue and conditionality, harmonization and alignment, and technical 
assistance and capacity building.    
 
A final and sometimes unspoken aspect of GBS is that it is a relatively easy 
way of disbursing aid.  It is likely to take a more significant role if the G8 
pledges to substantially increase aid to Sub-Saharan Africa are 
implemented.  It also seems inevitable that these new aid modalities will be 
critical in meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to which 
the international donor community agreed in the late 1990s.  We note that a 
leadership role for local government in meeting the MDGs was one of the 
themes of the 2007 Commonwealth Local Government Conference held in 
Auckland, New Zealand. 
 
To a substantial extent the move to sector and budget support was a 
reaction to the problems of the project-based approaches that had been well 
documented.  These include inter alia: their time bound nature; their 
tendency to pay high salaries and to attract the best personnel; and most 
importantly their tendency to ‘honeycomb’ established institutional 
structures and in many cases to bypass and undermine and weaken existing 
government systems.2  The result was that international assistance was 
systematically weakening the government systems it was supposed to be 
supporting.  This process has been well established and documented across 
much of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
It is worth noting that there are significant differences within the donor 
community in the extent to which they support GBS.  Budget support is 
widely supported by the UK (DFID), the Netherlands, Scandinavian donors 
(SIDA, Norway and Danida), and by multilateral agencies, notably the 
European Commission and the World Bank.  The United States (USAID), 
France and Japan are the main donors opposed to this approach, for a 
variety of reasons including accountability for funding to Congress (US), 
                                                
1
  The philosophy behind GBS is very clearly outlined in the UK ‘New Labour’ 
government’s first White Paper (1997) on development assistance: Eliminating World 
Poverty – A  challenge for the 21st Century, HMSO, London.  
2
  See Amis (2002) for a discussion of this evolution from projects through a sector wide 
approach to budget support in the Uganda context. 
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other political factors, and simple inertia.  German donors (GTZ and KfW) 
are also currently in the ‘outgroup’ but may be changing their approach. 
More broadly, there may have been a slight change in attitudes with the 
2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which included a 
commitment to “increased use of programme-based aid…” (OECD 2005, 
p6).  Precisely how this is implemented depends upon how it is interpreted 
in detail, but the impression conveyed is that all the major donors 
effectively signed up to a non-project way of disbursing aid.3 
 
The International Development Department (IDD) of the University of 
Birmingham led an international consortium to carry out a Joint Evaluation 
of Budget Support between 2004 and 2006.  This was a major, and the 
largest to date, evaluation of the impact of GBS, funded by 20 donors.  It 
involved a rigorous methodology; the development of a ‘causality map’ of 
the relationship between inputs and outputs, outcomes and possible 
impacts; plus individual country studies in Burkina Faso, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Uganda and Vietnam.  These results are 
published and available on the Internet elsewhere;4 and in this section we 
shall highlight some of the major findings. 
 
The literature suggests that the main advantages of general budget support 
are the following: improved harmonization amongst donors; alignment with 
partner countries; a reduction in transaction costs; improved efficiency in 
public expenditure; more predictable funding; more effective state and 
public funding; and finally improved domestic accountability through 
increased focus on the government’s own accountability channels. 
 
The Joint Evaluation was to give a positive assessment in five out of the 
seven countries (the exceptions were Malawi where there was a breakdown 
in the partnership, and Nicaragua where the process had hardly begun).  
This way of disbursing aid was found to have important positive and 
systematic effects, particularly in the field of public financial management 
in terms of bringing about an increase in discretionary budget funds, 
improved financial management, and in using government systems and 
budgets rather than setting up separate systems.  There were also some 
gains in the efficiency and effectiveness of expenditure.  These gains were 
all basically the result of working with and strengthening existing 
government systems.  Capacity building and technical assistance (TA) were 
important complimentary inputs but were often not well coordinated.  It 
was not really possible to judge the impacts of this approach on poverty 
reduction given the length of time needed to measure any impact, the 
problem of attribution, and data constraints.  However, it was broadly 
possible to trace through increases in expenditure in service delivery 
                                                
3
  However, differences remained apparent in the Joint Evaluation of Budget Support 
carried out in 2004-06 (IDD and Associates 2006).  
4
  All the GBS studies can be obtained from the DFID website 
http://www.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/evaluation-news.asp or from the OECD/DAC 
website www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation 
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ministries, in particular in health and education.  The results tended to 
confirm an increase in terms of quantitative coverage of services rather than 
improvements in quality in service delivery. 
 
In relation to aid delivery GBS was very successful in supporting donor 
harmonization and alignment, but it should be noted that this was also 
being promoted by other initiatives aimed at donor harmonization.  Finally, 
the evaluation also suggested the value of a complementary approach in 
using the different aid modalities, rather than suggesting that one modality 
was per se superior.  
 
On the negative side the principal observed drawback was for GBS to be 
unpredictable.  This mainly results from the fact that GBS is a very high 
profile way of disbursing aid with an implicit ‘seal of approval’ of the 
partner country on the recipient by the donor.  The result is that as a way of 
disbursing aid it is much more vulnerable to domestic political 
considerations affecting the donor country.  For example, in the last few 
years some donors have removed support from Uganda for ‘governance 
reasons’, while others (DFID) have limited support to Ethiopia on human 
rights grounds (repressive response to student demonstrations).  The 
starkest example is the removal of budget support to the Palestinian 
Authority following the recent Hamas electoral victory.  This is a major 
concern as it undermines one of the key theoretical advantages of GBS, 
namely the stability of funding arrangements.  
 
The second major area of concern was in relation to the claim that GBS 
increases domestic accountability: the evaluation found only limited 
examples of this effect taking place.  Thus the idea that GBS would 
increase the processes through which citizens, non-government 
organisations and others would hold their respective governments to 
account were (as yet) not materialising.  This has also be confirmed 
elsewhere (see Renzio, 2006).  
 
There is also some evidence that there is a degree of tension between GBS 
as an aid modality and the operation of a competitive multi-party 
democratic system.  Thus there are suggestions that in both Indian States 
and Sri Lanka opposition parties would not honour GBS agreements and 
that these would have to be renegotiated with a new political regime.  The 
practicality of operating GBS in genuinely democratic political systems is 
therefore somewhat problematic and has not received sufficient attention.  
That GBS seems to work best in one-party and/or authoritarian regimes 
may have some validity; however the driver for this seems to depend more 
upon a desire for donors to talk/negotiate with technocrats than on other 
more sinister political motives.5 
 
                                                
5
  See UNRISD Research and Policy Brief 3 (2004) Technocratic Policy Making and 
Democratic Accountability. 
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Finally, the Joint Evaluation examined three potential negative effects. 
Firstly, the suggestion that GBS would lead to an increase in fiduciary risk; 
secondly, that GBS would result in a substitution effect for local revenue 
collection; and finally, that it had an inherently pro public sector bias and 
might inhibit the private sector and/or growth.  On all three counts the 
study did not find adverse effects occurring.  In summary, the Joint 
Evaluation was ‘cautiously optimistic’ about the impact of GBS as a 
mechanism for disbursing aid. 
 
So it looks very much as if there has been a major change in the mechanism 
of aid disbursement and that the new approach associated with GBS is here 
to stay.  Furthermore, the processes of scaling up of aid and of some donors 
(eg DFID) putting limits on administrative costs are likely to significantly 
increase the importance of GBS as a way of delivering assistance.  The 
remainder of this paper addresses the significance of this change for 
processes of decentralization and local government and governance.  Or to 
put it in a more vulgar form: how can local government ‘get in’ on this new 
aid act?6 
GBS and Decentralization: Supporting or Weakening?  
In relation to decentralization the first point to make is that amongst many 
national government officials and donor economists local government is 
often treated as if it were invisible.  This partly reflects a pre-occupation 
with national policy and financial systems, but also an implicitly aspatial 
approach by economists.  This blind spot is all the more remarkable given 
that in most contemporary approaches to poverty reduction primary 
education and health are given a starring role.  In most political systems – 
including across the Commonwealth – local governments play an important 
role in delivering these services (Shah and Shan, 2006).7  
 
The process of GBS with its emphasis on the critical role of central 
ministries of finance and the importance of public financial management 
(PFM) is likely to increase this centralizing tendency.  That GBS supports 
the role of ministries of finance viz-a-viz other ministries was a common 
finding in the Joint Evaluation.  Indeed the emphasis of putting everything 
‘on budget’ is a deliberate attempt to try to strengthen the ministries of 
finance as the sole provider of financial resources.8 
 
It is important to understand that this is partly an attempt to undermine both 
a project and a sector wide (or SWAP) approach.  The latter often sets up a 
                                                
6
  This may seem a crude way of raising the issue but it has often been aired to the author 
by various interested government and donor officials. 
7
  There are some indications that the primary education and health plus market-led 
economic growth approach to poverty reduction may be beginning to be challenged. It is 
likely that the future may see a stronger emphasis on the provision of infrastructure for 
economic growth. The Report of the Commission for Africa 2005 can be read as 
suggesting this shift. 
8
  Providing aid on budget was one of the indicators (indicator 5) highlighted in the 2005 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness; (OECD, 2005, p5 and p9). 
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situation where interest groups (or policy networks or communities) 
including both ministry and donor officials are established to promote aid 
and expenditure in specific sectors.  To caricature the situation, it is quite 
common for a donor official with a particular sector objective (say health or 
education advisors) to form an alliance with the personnel in the relevant 
ministry.  Their objectives are to get more funds for their specific sector, 
often in the form of sector wide budget support and/or a SWAP.  These 
interests are often not congruent with macro-economic considerations, 
general budget support and the thinking of the relevant ministry of finance. 
 
While working in Uganda in 2002 I was able to observe a dispute between 
the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Health around such an issue.  
The latter was in the process of receiving sector support for health and 
HIV/AIDs that it had negotiated separately with specific donors. 
Meanwhile the Ministry of Finance was sought to prevent the transfer of 
funds arguing that it would jeopardize Uganda’s overall macro-economic 
stability, exchange rate and inflation targets.9  This was a clear illustration 
of the conflict around the mechanisms through which overseas aid could be 
disbursed in the Ugandan context.  The mandate of ministries of finance in 
most countries, together with the logic of GBS, supports the former taking 
the lead in managing external assistance.  This is entirely consistent with 
the notion that all external assistance should use existing governmental 
systems. 
 
The majority of SWAPs and/or sector plans are a vehicle for a multiple 
donor approach, whereby a range of donors seek to combine their efforts 
within a given sector.  This usually involves designing a sector plan to 
which a multiplicity of donors are able to contribute either through ‘basket 
funding’ or with each donor agreeing to fund separate sections of the plan.  
The development of such a sector approach is thus a very important 
component of a general donor attempt at harmonization and alignment. 
 
In most cases the sector approaches, depending upon local circumstances, 
are first developed in the health and education ministries.  This seems to 
reflect both the importance of the two sectors in poverty reduction and also 
the relative ease of coordination.10  At its simplest the negotiation is 
between the relevant donors in a sector plan and the ministry, which is seen 
as the major institution for service delivery in the sector.11  The impression 
                                                
9
  There was a heated debate between the two ministries, even using international experts 
to support their respective positions. Unfortunately I was not there to see the result but 
am inclined to agree with the IMF country representative who noted that they were both 
‘overstating’ their respective cases. 
10
  Broadly speaking the donors who are interested in new aid modalities are also those 
with a keener focus explicitly on poverty reduction. This is perhaps not accidental as it is 
the impact on poverty that is often used to justify such an approach to the taxpayers of 
the North. 
11
  This comfortable assumption may not be as clear as it seems. In many countries, for 
example Malawi, the public sector is not the main provider of health and education 
services. These are primarily provided by non-state actors, in particular faith-based 
NGOs who account for more than 50 % of the delivery of both education and health 
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gained is that these are the two easiest sectors in which to achieve a joint 
sector plan and a multiple donor funded SWAP.  Nevertheless the amount 
of time and effort required on all sides to make such arrangements work 
should not be underestimated – in particular amongst donor officials.  This 
is particularly the case with personnel from the lead donor who must 
usually not only organise the relevant groups and/or committees, but also 
persuade new donors to join the partnership and energise the process.12  All 
the anecdotal evidence suggests that these are not easy arrangements to 
establish: they require substantial personnel and resource inputs. 
 
For many donors a commitment to donor harmonisation and such sector 
approaches is effectively a central directive from their headquarters, as is 
the case with most north European and Scandinavian donor agencies.  Thus 
there are pressures to extend such arrangements to other sectors.  The next 
sectors are often agriculture, water and sanitation, and law and justice, with 
local government and decentralization being somewhat of a laggard.  The 
complexity of arrangements seems to depend in part upon the extent to 
which the core ministry is really the main actor in the sector, as is the case 
in education and health. 
 
Local government would seem an obvious candidate for a sector approach, 
not least given its importance in poverty reduction.  However for reasons 
we shall discuss it is somewhat problematic for the design of such 
programs.  In Kenya, Malawi, Ghana, Mozambique and Rwanda, to name 
those known to the author, there are ongoing attempts to develop sector 
programs for local government.  As we shall discuss Uganda is an 
exception in having completed the development of a program.   
 
The following reasons seem to explain why it is difficult to design sector 
programs for local government and decentralization: 
 
 The number and diversity of stakeholders 
 Potential confusion as to who are the key stakeholders: eg the 
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Local Government or the local 
government bodies themselves 
 Donors unable to agree about the most appropriate approach to 
decentralisation13 
                                                                                                             
services. Nevertheless it can still be argued that the public sector is the main organizing 
agency for the two sectors. 
12
  There is an issue in many donor agencies about how to account for time spent in this 
way. 
13
  It is tempting to suggest that each donor has a tendency to seek to replicate its own 
country’s system of local government, more so than in other sectors. Thus there are more 
competing ‘models’ and examples of ‘best practice’ in local government. Perhaps the 
differences are at a more fundamental level and it is thus harder to get agreement than in, 
say, education and health. This observation is partly based on discussions with Danida, 
DFID, GTZ and USAID representatives whilst undertaking consultancy missions. 
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 Tension with the Ministry of Finance controlling agenda: who 
ultimately should control the funds and how they are allocated out 
to lower tiers of government? 
 Weak financial and management capacity both at the Ministry of 
Local Government and in local government bodies themselves: in 
most countries local government is one of the weaker line 
ministries 
 Confusion with other line ministries such as health and education 
that may have already devolved programs to a local level 
 A tendency for public sector reform programs not to include local 
government as a national priority. 
 
There is also a debate about the most effective system of central-local 
transfers to be used, depending upon specific government objectives (see 
Shah and Shah, 2006).  However, it is clear that it is important to have a 
system of central-local transfers that is regular, robust and formula driven 
through which funds can flow easily and effectively. 
 
In summary there is a somewhat worrying possibility that decentralization 
processes do not easily fit into the new aid architecture.  The issues set out 
above will need to be addressed if GBS and local governments are both to 
play their respective roles in reducing poverty and achieving the MDGs. 
This is a complex, awkward, daunting but potentially achievable task.   
 
As part of the Joint Evaluation a special study was commissioned into the 
relationship between GBS and decentralization in Uganda (see Annex 6 by 
Jesper Steffensen in Lister et al, 2006). The main conclusions were as 
follows. 
 
 GBS strongly facilitated an increase in funding to local government 
and related service delivery functions that would not have 
happened with other aid modalities.  The combination of GBS with 
a Poverty Action Fund (PAF), ring fencing of funds, some SWAPs 
and inter-governmental fiscal transfers gave both sector ministries 
and donors sufficient confidence to channel funds to local 
government and service delivery. 
 This was supported by capacity building and harmonisation and 
alignment with Ugandan government procedures and processes. 
 However, there have been problems with local government 
autonomy and flexibility in financial management, with concerns 
being raised about sustainability and local revenue collection.14  
 There was also a tendency to increase upward accountability, often 
associated with conditions attached to SWAP and PAF funds.  It is 
pertinent to note that these conditionalities are in fact to a large 
extent a function of those funds being debt relief.  Conditions are 
                                                
14
  The Ugandan government has ceased to require local governments from collecting 
their own revenues. Central local transfers have effectively substituted for this politically 
unpopular revenue source. 
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applied to reassure Northern taxpayers that debt ‘write offs’ are 
being used for poverty alleviation.  
 
The central question that needs to be posed is: do these new mechanisms of 
aid disbursement strengthen or weaken local systems of government?  Or to 
put it another way: is decentralization compatible with the new aid 
modalities, increased funding flows and related commitments to meeting 
the MDGs?  This is both a very important and disquieting question.  
 
One interpretation suggests that increasing funding from the centre 
strengthens upward accountability to line ministries with a resultant 
‘hollowing out’ of local government systems and functions.  This was 
apparent in Uganda in the early 2000s; it made more sense for local 
government officials to spend time seeking to access funds from their 
respective line ministries than either collecting local taxation or working to 
coordinate activities within the local government system.  This tendency 
seems particularly likely in new aid disbursement systems that have a 
strong sector approach.  That the SWAP approach may be harmful to 
processes of decentralization is a relatively familiar argument and concern 
amongst reflective practitioners in the field.  
 
An alternative view – at least in theory - is that GBS should strengthen 
local systems of accountability as the funds are dispersed through 
government systems.  That GBS by strengthening and government systems 
would support local accountability was not confirmed by the Joint 
Evaluation.  However, two caveats on those findings may be appropriate. 
Firstly, the new funding arrangements may not have had sufficient time to 
‘bed-down’ with politicians, citizens and others learning new roles and 
responsibilities.  Secondly, it is worth noting that other ways of disbursing 
aid – especially projects – have lines of accountability that are internal to 
the project rather than to local democratic systems.  In reality most forms of 
dispensing aid are not democratically accountable. 
 
The Ugandan experience and overall success seems to pose a more 
complicated and fundamental question:  Is it fair and/or realistic to expect 
local government to be sustainable and self-financing in a national 
economy which is itself highly aid dependent?  This question was 
stimulated by discussions with Danida officials who were concerned that 
local and district governments were too dependent upon external funding 
and therefore not sustainable.  The discussion would then note that this 
reliance on external funds could be and was replicated at the national level. 
In a situation of commitment to MDGs and poverty reduction in an aid-
dependent country, increased transfers to local government from the centre 
can easily undermine decentralization processes.   
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Is the apparent tension between new aid modalities – GBS – and local 
government/decentralisation largely one between short run and long run 
objectives, or does it reflect a more fundamental contradiction?  There is no 
simple answer.  It is interesting to compare the neighbouring countries of 
Kenya and Uganda: in the former the central government is now effectively 
independent of external assistance, while the latter is highly aid-dependent. 
The impact of changes in aid disbursement arrangements will clearly have a 
greater impact in Uganda than Kenya. 
 
A tentative conclusion is that is in aid-dependent countries the new ways of 
disbursing aid are likely to weaken and/or undermine local government, 
whilst the same instruments in non aid-dependent countries are likely to 
strengthen local governments.  In making such arrangements work the key 
variable remains local government capacity, and capacity building remains 
the principal intervention required in the sector. 
 
One of the advantages of providing GBS to local government is that it not 
as politically visible as such assistance is to a sovereign government.  It is 
thus somewhat less likely to suffer from the problems of uncertainty and 
unpredictability associated with the transfer of funds directly to national 
governments as discussed earlier.  Furthermore local governments in 
general do not have the potentially repressive functions that central 
governments control. Human rights issues are rarely directly associated 
with local governments.  
 
It is possible to make the case that such new aid modalities could also be 
used to directly fund larger municipal governments.  Within Sub-Saharan 
Africa there is no question that the larger urban areas (for example 
Johannesburg and perhaps Nairobi) have higher GDPs than many countries 
that have received GBS (for example Malawi). There are of course 
questions about whether national governments would allow such 
transfers.15  Nevertheless it is worth noting that DFID’s relatively 
successful slum improvement projects in India were effectively using a 
very similar method by providing funding directly to local governments, 
albeit with conditions over expenditure and a process of monitoring (Amis, 
2001).  
 
Finally, despite the evidence not being clear we are left with two worrying 
questions.  Firstly, can decentralized governance and accountability be 
integrated into new ways of disbursing aid?  And secondly, is the new aid 
architecture itself in danger of undermining the decentralization process 
and emerging systems of local government?” 
                                                
15
  This mirrors the debate in India about whether GBS could be provided directly to 
State Governments. Both the UK (DFID) and the Netherlands have provided such 
assistance to the States of Andra Pradesh and Kerala respectively. 
 AMIS:   New Aid Modalities  
 
 CJLG  May 2008  125 
 




Amis, P (2001) “Rethinking UK Aid: lessons from an impact assessment study of 
DFIDs Slum Improvement projects” (2001) in Environment and Urbanization  
Vol. 13, No1. pp101-103 
 
Amis, (2002) Uganda: A country case study for OECD Study of Donor Practices 2002- 
2003 Birmingham: International Development Department, University of  
Birmingham 
 
HMSO, (1997) Eliminating World Poverty: A challenge for the 21st Century A White 
Paper on International Development 
 
IDD and Associates (2006) Evaluation of General Budget Support: Synthesis report  
Birmingham: International Development Department, University of Birmingham 
 
Lister et al (2006) Joint Evaluation of General Budget Support: Uganda Country  
Report Stephen Lister, Wilson Baryabanoha, Jesper Steffensen and Tim  
Willamson. Glasgow. DFID. 
 
OECD (2005) Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonisation,  
Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability. 
 
Renzio, Paulo de (2006) Aid, Budgets and Accountability: A survey article  
Development Policy Review 24 (6): 627-645 
 
Shah, A and Shah, S  (2006) The New Vision of Local Governance and the Evolving  
Roles of Local Governments  in Shan, A (ed) Local Governance in Developing  
Countries World Bank  
 
UNRISD Research and Policy Brief 3 (2004) Technocratic Policy Making and 
Democratic Accountability 
